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Entries in Nuclear Power Plant Security (3)

Nuclear reactors scrutinized

Nuclear reactors scrutinized

Government report claims research facilities not secure; regulatory commission questions findings

Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressed dissatisfaction after the Government Accountability Office released an audit report claiming that the commission has underestimated the risk of terrorist attacks on its licensed nuclear research reactors.

The report said research reactors, though less powerful than commercial nuclear reactors, may be targeted by terrorists who could use the reactors’ fuel to create nuclear weapons or disperse radioactive materials.

The GAO report pointed out that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s security measures are largely based on regulations it had in place before Sept. 11 and places doubt on the commission’s assessments in reflecting the full range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors. It recommends that the commission reassess the security of its licensed research reactors.

There are 37 research reactors in the U.S., 27 of which are located on university campuses. UC Davis and UC Irvine are the two UC campuses which have a research reactor.

Members of the NRC said they are not pleased with the message of the report. In a letter addressed to the director of the GAO, the commission launched a series of complaints about what they described as the report’s unbalanced assessment of the commission’s effort to enhance security after Sept. 11,

In the letter, the commission said that much of the report hinges on a sample document prepared by Idaho National Laboratory which did not receive credible technical review. The commission also said the report lacks a sound technical basis or credible intelligence information in support of its recommendations.

Eliot Brenner, director of Public Affairs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said the report’s credibility is questionable at best.

“It is unbalanced, misrepresents and excludes facts, and fails to acknowledge experts who disagree,” Brenner said.

Brenner emphasizes that the NRC takes security of all nuclear material very seriously, whether a power reactor or research reactor.

“The security for each research reactor is customized on the threat and on the risk. If we sense a change of threat, we would not hesitate to order increased security for the research reactor,” Brenner said.

He said that both the NRC and the labs have made it clear that they are not happy with the report. He called the GAO “fallible.”

“In this case they fail and they know it,” Brenner said. “This is a poor effort and they ought to be embarrassed.”

While UC Irvine also has a research reactor on its campus, George Miller, the UCI nuclear reactor facility director, said the school has enforced sufficient security measures around its reactor.

“We are fully compliant to the NRC’s rules ... and we believe it’s a sensible assessment at this time,” Miller said.

Miller said he believed that the commission has properly assessed the risk situation.

He maintained that his department has substantially raised security measures in the last 10 years as well as after Sept. 11.

“We see this as a battle between GAO and NRC over whose experts make most sense,” Miller said.

David Rapoport, professor emeritus of political science, said terrorists would rarely target nuclear materials.

He said terrorists tend to target places where there are crowds and access is easy, such as a stadium during a football game, an airport or landmarks. They also tend to go for the simplest kind of weapon for maximum mobility.

“It seems that this argument (of the audit report) is largely based on some evidence that terrorists have increased their interest in capacity in gaining access to nuclear materials,” Rapoport said. “Most people who know anything about terrorist activities would not agree with that. It’s not the sort of weapons they normally use or concern (themselves) with.”

Bethany Lyles, a nuclear engineering postdoctoral scholar at UC Berkeley, also said she did not see a high possibility of a terrorist attack on nuclear reactors on university campuses.

“The biggest risk would be someone who has access to the reactor to try to convert the material to useful material,” Lyles said. “It has to be someone who has access, knows what he’s doing. ... This has to be a sophisticated inside job.”

She said while it is possible that terrorists could receive such sophisticated training, she did not think it would be easy for them to enter a lab and convert the material without people noticing since the process is very complex and requires advanced equipment.

Rapoport said it is hard to tell whether the audit report’s warning is valid. He said he attributes any anxiety to what he feels is the government’s excessive concern with weapons of mass destruction.

“Sept. 11 is the result of our obsession with weapons of mass destruction,” he said, saying that the government overlooked other terrorist methods, such as hi-jacking airplanes.

“Before Sept. 11 we were obsessed with the fact that the attack that would occur would be to do with WMD. In all the conferences in Washington, that’s all they talk about.”

Posted on Friday, February 15, 2008 at 11:05AM by Registered CommenterGregor Gable in | CommentsPost a Comment | EmailEmail | PrintPrint

$650,000 Fine Urged for Indian Point Owner

$650,000 Fine Urged for Indian Point Owner


Published: January 25, 2008

WASHINGTON — The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a fine of $650,000 — 10 times the normal size — against the owner of the Indian Point reactors because it missed a deadline to install new emergency warning sirens with backup power supplies.

The commission said Thursday that it would consider additional fines if the system is not finished “in a timely manner.”

Indian Point has had sirens for more than 20 years, but a provision in the 2005 energy act, inserted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, requires battery backups for sirens around plants in high-population areas. The Indian Point site, in Buchanan, N.Y., on the east bank of the Hudson River about 35 miles north of Midtown Manhattan, is the only site that qualifies.

The owner of the reactors, Entergy Nuclear, said it had installed 150 new sirens within 10 miles of the plant, all with battery backup. But the system needs the approval of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the commission said it was fining Entergy for “inadequate actions in support of FEMA’s review” and for “inadequate management oversight” of the project.

The system was supposed to be done a year ago. Entergy was given one extension but then missed the new deadline. The old siren system remains operable, but has no power backup.

Entergy said in a statement that it “regrets the problems that repeatedly have arisen.”

“We apologize to our neighbors in those communities for the delays that have occurred in making this new system operable,” the company said. “We are working with the four counties surrounding Indian Point, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the N.R.C. to ensure that the remaining issues will be resolved and the system approved by FEMA as quickly as possible.”

Posted on Saturday, January 26, 2008 at 03:15PM by Registered CommenterGregor Gable in | CommentsPost a Comment | EmailEmail | PrintPrint

A Nuclear Site Is Breached

A Nuclear Site Is Breached

South African Attack Should Sound Alarms

By Micah Zenko
Thursday, December 20, 2007; Page A29

An underreported attack on a South African nuclear facility last month demonstrates the high risk of theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or criminals. Such a crime could have grave national security implications for the United States or any of the dozens of countries where nuclear materials are held in various states of security.

Shortly after midnight on Nov. 8, four armed men broke into the Pelindaba nuclear facility 18 miles west of Pretoria, a site where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium are stored. According to the South African Nuclear Energy Corp., the state-owned entity that runs the Pelindaba facility, these four "technically sophisticated criminals" deactivated several layers of security, including a 10,000-volt electrical fence, suggesting insider knowledge of the system. Though their images were captured on closed-circuit television, they were not detected by security officers because nobody was monitoring the cameras at the time.

So, undetected, the four men spent 45 minutes inside one of South Africa's most heavily guarded "national key points" -- defined by the government as "any place or area that is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic."

Eventually, the attackers broke into the emergency control center in the middle of the facility, stole a computer (which was ultimately left behind) and breached an electronically sealed control room. After a brief struggle, they shot Anton Gerber, an off-duty emergency services officer. Gerber later explained that he was hanging around because he believed (reasonably, in retrospect) that his fiancée -- a site supervisor -- was not safe at work. Although badly injured, Gerber triggered the alarm, setting off sirens and lights and alerting police stationed a few miles away.

Nevertheless, the four escaped, leaving the facility the same way they broke in.

Amazingly, at the same time those four men entered Pelindaba from its eastern perimeter, a separate group of intruders failed in an attempt to break in from the west. The timing suggests a coordinated attack against a facility that contains an estimated 25 bombs' worth of weapons-grade nuclear material. On Nov. 16, local police arrested three suspects, ranging in age from 17 to 28, in connection with this incident.


 

In response to the successful attack, the South African Nuclear Energy Corp. suspended six Pelindaba security personnel, including the general manager of security, and promised an "internal investigation which will cover culpability, negligence and improvements of Security Systems." It should be noted that Pelindaba's security was considered to have been upgraded after a break-in there two years ago (one individual was detained shortly after breaching the security fence).

It is still unclear why the two groups of intruders sought to break into this particular facility. More important, however, is that had the armed attackers succeeded in penetrating the site's highly enriched uranium storage vault, where the weapons-grade nuclear material is believed to be held, they could have carried away the ingredients for the world's first terrorist nuclear bomb.

As this incident shows, nuclear terrorism is a global issue, extending far beyond the familiar policy talking points of U.S. cooperation with Russia over its nuclear stockpiles, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the face of threats from Islamic extremists, and concerns that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities it could provide a bomb to sympathetic terrorist organizations.

Indeed, the essential ingredients required for making a nuclear weapon exist in more than 40 countries, in facilities with differing levels of security. Unfortunately, there are still no binding global standards on how to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material. In the absence of sustained political leadership from the world's nuclear powers to develop, agree to and implement effective nuclear security standards, armed attacks such as the one at Pelindaba could become commonplace.

Micah Zenko is a research associate in the project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

Posted on Thursday, January 3, 2008 at 07:55AM by Registered CommenterGregor Gable in | CommentsPost a Comment | EmailEmail | PrintPrint